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BEYOND EUREKA: WHAT CREATORS WANT 
(FREEDOM, CREDIT, AND AUDIENCES) AND 
HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CAN BETTER 
GIVE IT TO THE THEM (BY SUPPORTING 
SHARING, LICENSING, AND ATTRIBUTION) 
Colleen Chien* 
THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY. By Jessica Silbey. California: Stanford University Press. 2015. Pp. 
xi, 285. Cloth, $85; paper, $25.95. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
I read Jessica Silbey’s book, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Inventors, and 
Everyday Intellectual Property,1 while I was on sabbatical. The word sabbati-
cal, like the word Sabbath,2 conjures a sense of rest and a break from the day-
to-day rhythms of commerce, transactions, and, for me as a professor, teach-
ing. My husband was on sabbatical as well, and we and our two young sons 
spent much of the summer in the house in Belgium where my husband grew 
up, enjoying late sunsets, visiting with friends, and biking through idyllic 
pasturelands. Summer is supposed to be a carefree time, and for me it was—
at times. But not until my sons were asleep or away at school or child care 
programs did I have the time and space to rest, reflect, and refocus on my 
writing projects, including this Review—to get the work done. 
In the theater of the courtroom or the rough and tumble arena of intel-
lectual property policymaking, the day-to-day lives of creators are rarely pre-
sented. We often instead see one-dimensional vignettes, for example, “the 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law and former 
Obama Administration Senior Advisor, Intellectual Property and Innovation, White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy. I thank Robert Merges, Paul Heald, Eric Goldman, 
Jeanne Fromer, Petra Moser, Jorge Contreras, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, David Schwartz, 
Tyler Ochoa, Brian Love, Pam Samuelson, and Jessica Silbey for helpful discussions, and the 
editors of the Michigan Law Review, in particular Jenny Stone and Will Martin, for their pa-
tience and helpful edits. 
 1. Jessica Silbey is a Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.   
 2. Sabbatical, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/sabbatical [https://perma.cc/WQ3Y-CLJJ] (the origin of the word 
“sabbatical” is from the late sixteenth century, from Greek sabbatikos “of the sabbath”). 
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new artist or band that has just released their [sic] first single and will not be 
paid for its success,” described on Taylor Swift’s Tumblr last summer when 
she initially withdrew from Apple’s music streaming service.3 While instruc-
tive, this description leaves out that Swift and other artists have long relied 
on “free play” mediums like radio and, more recently, YouTube to develop, 
not cannibalize, their audiences and followers.4 Such accounts ignore both 
context and the complex relationship between what creators want and need 
and what intellectual property provides. 
These are a few of the reasons that Jessica Silbey’s book, The Eureka 
Myth, is both refreshing and important. In it, she draws from over fifty in-
terviews, completed over half a decade, with an array of creative profession-
als, including filmmakers, photographers, sculptors, journalists, novelists, 
musicians, composers, hardware and software engineers, biologists, publish-
ers, computer scientists, and business executives.5 Silbey asked them about 
their work, the challenges they faced, why and how they overcame profes-
sional obstacles, joys they experienced, and what was important to them. 
And at the end of each interview, she asked them what they thought about 
intellectual property (pp. 291–92). The resulting insights are as true as they 
are original. 
Take the experiences of Joan,6 an internationally known public artist 
whose statements appear throughout the book. Joan is a woman who “want-
ed to make paintings. I wanted to publish them. But I didn’t want to own 
them. . . . It’s like having a litter of puppies and you [find] a good home for 
each one of them” (p. 1; omission and alteration in original). Having to 
maintain, store, and find “good homes” for artistic works is a practical bur-
den—one that, unless you are a visual artist, may not be the first thing that 
comes to mind.7 Though placing puppies is a far cry from the fundamental 
purposes of intellectual property—which according to the Supreme Court 
include “inducing dissemination[ ]as opposed to creation”8—both creators 
and legal systems want to ensure the same end. Both want works to be creat-
ed and disseminated to their audiences rather than kept in the minds or 
storage spaces of creative people. 
But can intellectual property help achieve this end? Does it, on net, do 
so? And how might intellectual property be changed to advance the shared 
interest of creators and policymakers in the creation and dissemination of 
creative works? 
 
 3. Taylor Swift, To Apple, Love Taylor, TUMBLR (June 21, 2015), http://
taylorswift.tumblr.com/post/122071902085/to-apple-love-taylor [http://perma.cc/8YP6-S6BL].  
 4. See Tom Conrad (@tconrad), TWITTER (June 22, 2015, 10:37 AM), https://
twitter.com/tconrad/status/613038036880744448 [https://perma.cc/F9VD-DCVD].  
 5. See pp. 287, 290.  
 6. This and the other names used throughout this Review are pseudonyms provided by 
Silbey to protect the privacy of her subjects. P. 297.  
 7. See p. 1.  
 8. P. 222 (quoting Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (emphasis omitted)).  
CHIEN FR EDITS INCORPED.3  (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2016  4:26 PM 
201N] Beyond Eureka 103 
The Eureka Myth provides authentic, if not always straightforward, an-
swers to these questions. And in presenting the perspective of creators, it 
provides much more—namely, accounts of how factors like serendipity, cir-
cumstance, and hard work really matter. It shows glimpses of the importance 
to creators of space, time, and the freedom to work on projects that one be-
lieves are worthwhile. It does so in an age in which declines in the cost of 
communication, content discovery, and replication9 are presenting creators 
with many more pathways, users, and uses in disseminating their work, even 
as intellectual property’s default is to exclude them. 
The result is a distillation of what, in their own words, creators want and 
the degree to which intellectual property does or does not align with these 
desires. While many commentators purport to represent the interests of art-
ists and inventors, the creators that Silbey interviews speak for themselves 
throughout the book. Their experiences endow Silbey’s observations and 
findings with an authenticity that other accounts lack. In the paragraphs that 
follow I draw from them and describe how in many cases they challenge, and 
in some others they support, traditional notions of intellectual property. Ex-
tending from this base, I bring other voices into the conversation—including 
related narratives, historical and modern empirical studies, and my own re-
search—to consider what an intellectual property system keenly attuned to 
the needs of creators might look like, while recognizing that creators are not 
the only important constituency the intellectual property system needs to 
care about. 
What creators want isn’t all that surprising: freedom, credit, and rela-
tionships with their audiences and customers. What intellectual property of-
fers is also fairly straightforward: the right to exclude, including the right to 
pursue legal actions against others for copying, misappropriating, or tread-
ing on one’s work. These are not the same, as Chapter 3, entitled “Making 
Do with a Mismatch” recounts in detail, but the degree of match varies wide-
ly. In some of the cases Silbey reviews, intellectual property is perceived to be 
critical to support a protected space in which research and creative agendas 
can thrive (p. 217). In other contexts, intellectual property is just one of 
many factors that matter to creators; other times it is entirely beside the 
point.10 In yet other cases, intellectual property sends the wrong message 
(“go away”) and actually undermines creators by, for example, deterring the 
audiences they are trying to reach or Pareto suboptimally discouraging paid 
or free uses that would benefit both licensee and licensor.11 Across these sce-
 
 9. For an overview of the technologies that have reduced the cost of creating, distrib-
uting, and reproducing (i.e. the internet, 3D printing, synthetic biology, and robotics), see 
Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 468–81 (2015).  
 10. See pp. 81–82. 
 11. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: 
Causal Evidence from the Courts 30 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
2247011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247011 [http://perma.cc/
GH2P-37QQ] (concluding, based on their analysis, that some—potentially feasible—licensing 
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narios, what creators seek is an accurate expression of their desires. They 
seek the ability to deploy intellectual property flexibly to achieve their de-
sired ends of complete exclusion, complete inclusion, and everything in be-
tween. They want choice, and they want control. 
In order to support creators’ desires for freedom, credit, and audiences 
during a time of declining communication, marketing, production, and re-
production costs, policymakers could consider reorienting intellectual prop-
erty to better support goals other than exclusion. Making it easier for poten-
tial sellers and buyers of works to find each other, building more reliability 
into existing contract-based sharing regimes, and making paid and unpaid 
sharing easier—including through orphan-works reform and supporting li-
censing, defensive patenting, and humanitarian or public-domain dedica-
tion, as others have suggested—could go far to enhance creators’ reputations 
and audiences’ freedom to play and ability to get paid. Encouraging users 
and others to give accurate credit to creators—by taking attribution into ac-
count when copyright is enforced, enforcing commitments to attribute, and 
codifying best practices in attribution, as others have considered—would 
create a better alignment between U.S. intellectual property law and the ex-
pressive and personhood desires of creators and their audiences. Below I de-
scribe what The Eureka Myth and related works say about what creators 
want, and the implications of those desires for intellectual property. 
I.  WHAT CREATORS WANT 
The primary purpose of intellectual property law is to motivate the pro-
duction and dissemination of artistic, scientific, and technological works.12 
But to induce authors and inventors to take such steps requires an under-
standing of what motivates them. The first part of this essay distills the de-
sires expressed by Silbey’s subjects.  Across a broad swath of fields, settings, 
and creative endeavors, creators expressed three desires: freedom, credit, and 
audiences. 
A.  Freedom 
Freedom is essential to the creative process. Below, I describe how three 
freedoms—freedom to do meaningful work; freedom to play, borrow, and 
build upon; and freedom through revenue generation—and their pursuit de-
fine the substance and process of creation. 
 
failure is taking place insofar as deals that would benefit both parties are not taking place in the 
presence of patent protection). 
 12. E.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1750–52 (2012). 
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1.  Freedom to Do Meaningful Work 
“Autonomy, mastery, and purpose” motivate creative people to do their 
best work, according to Daniel Pink’s well-known book, Drive.13 Among 
Silbey’s subjects, the freedom they feel while they work is the “common de-
fining pleasure.” Common themes include the freedom to play, the freedom 
to have fun, and the freedom to make things (p. 41). Freedom also means au-
tonomy and control, including control over one’s schedule and control over 
the content of what one works on. 
Many of Silbey’s subjects value freedom and flexibility more than money 
and are willing to take less pay (though, notably, not no pay) for more free-
dom (p. 44). As Thomas, a software engineer and entrepreneur, said: 
The one thing that my job has always given me is a lot of flexibility and a lot 
of room. And I appreciated that a lot, because I could do pretty much any-
thing I wanted, and I could pursue any projects that I wanted. So that, at 
that time, meant more to me than additional money. (p. 43) 
Programs at well-run companies seek to free up the time of their em-
ployees by offering time-saving perks like on-site fitness centers, childcare, 
and subsidized food.14 Similarly, the nature of the creative process means 
that there are particular freedoms important to creators that intellectual 
property can either support or hinder. 
2.  Freedom to Play, Borrow, and Build Upon 
The freedom to play and to discover is particularly important during the 
early stages of creating. Leo, a well-known visual artist, started out as a law-
yer who entertained ideas of becoming a writer. While playing and experi-
menting with different sorts of paint materials in his kitchen in the evenings, 
he devised a new way of making paintings (p. 42). Another subject, Ted, 
talked about the “juvenile delinquents” at his bioengineering company that 
try to break stuff and come up with new inventions and discoveries in the 
process and are among the most prolific inventors in his company (pp. 42–
43). Play can be motivated by a desire to solve a problem, but the result is of-
ten serendipitous, like Leo’s paint technique. It was never the goal; it just 
happened. 
 
 13. DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE 80 (2009). See generally Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, 
Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and 
Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 68 (2000) (describing how satisfaction of the basic hu-
man needs for “competence, autonomy, and relatedness,” motivates people); Teresa Amabile & 
Steve Kramer, What Doesn’t Motivate Creativity Can Kill It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 25, 2012), 
https://hbr.org/2012/04/balancing-the-four-factors-tha-1 [https://perma.cc/P2SF-8YPC] (de-
scribing the importance of intrinsic motivation to creativity). 
 14. See, e.g., 100 Best Companies to Work For 2015, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/best-
companies/sas-institute-4/ [http://perma.cc/92YV-67RS] (listing SAS Institute as the fourth 
best company to work for). 
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The freedom to play is closely related to the freedom to draw upon and 
be inspired by others. Silbey’s interviewees are the first to acknowledge that 
their talents are not just in creating completely new ideas from whole cloth, 
but also in “bringing ideas from different areas together,” or the ability to 
“tweak, move [] around, adapt [content] . . . and then add in” other content 
(p. 47). One subject laments the decline of creative works made from scratch, 
as technology makes it easier and easier to create works that reflect “an ac-
cumulation, a compilation, [and] a conglomeration of different elements” (p. 
48). But her observation flows from a well-established sense of the creative 
process as highly iterative in nature, and the creative outputs, at times, are as 
inevitable as they are tremendous. Calculus, evolution, and decimal fractions 
are a few of the many example of inventions created simultaneously by 
groups of inventors.15 
By its nature, intellectual property places limits, sometimes significant 
ones, on the freedom of innovators to innovate freely, without worrying 
about getting the requisite permissions. Take the example of patents, in par-
ticular software patents—which many, including one of the nation’s most 
prominent venture capitalists—view to be “a major inhibitor of innova-
tion.”16 Surveys I have done have found that patent assertions, primarily by 
patent trolls, have caused companies to pivot away from, discontinue, and 
stop selling products.17 A handful of other studies have found that they also 
reduce R&D.18 
In fact, it is the freedom from assertions, rather than the conventional 
“incentive” to innovate story, that motivate a number of Silbey’s subjects to 
amass their own intellectual property, consistent with the existing literature. 
For example, 59 percent of 765 research-and-development managers sur-
veyed by Cohen and his colleagues indicated that preventing suits or defen-
sive objectives motived the acquisition of their last product innovation pa-
tent.19 Companies in technology sectors, initially spurred by the licensing 
 
 15. William F. Ogburn & Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social 
Evolution, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 83, 83 (1922). 
 16. Fred Wilson, Permissionless Innovation and Patents, AVC (Feb. 19, 2010),  http://
avc.com/2010/02/permissionless-innovation-and-patents/ [https://perma.cc/9NW3-B5LA]. 
 17. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014). 
 18. See Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 15‐002, 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/15-
002_6806e22c-a7a6-45d8-bf1a-78cad85f20f5.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBW8-9YNJ]; Roger 
Smeets, Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate R&D? An Analysis of US Public Firms 2–5 
(Tilburg Univ., Working Paper, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac 
t_id=2443048 [https://perma.cc/6TN9-QEA6]. 
 19. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Condi-
tions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) fig.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf [https://perma.cc/
82RQ-7LKN]; see also Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of 
Patents in Japan and the U.S.: Major Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey 
fig.13 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade and Indus., Discussion Paper No. 09-E-011, 2009), 
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campaigns of Texas Instruments and IBM, now routinely engage in defen-
sive patenting,20 where innovation is cumulative and incremental. This gives 
their engineers and scientists the freedom to play, experiment, and use any 
starting materials, developed in-house or elsewhere, that they desire. Silbey’s 
interviews confirm that defensive or portfolio patenting is used not only in 
high tech, but also in the biosciences. As Dennis, who works at a publicly-
traded, global pharmaceutical company, explains to his scientists: 
I agree that this subject matter likely shouldn’t be patentable. But . . . right 
now, it is being patented by other people, and we’re having to analyze their 
patents, spend tens of thousands of dollars analyzing them, rendering opin-
ions, telling business people they have to make business risks based upon 
infringement issues. And . . . we’re taking licenses. . . . What I want is some-
thing that I can trade with somebody . . . I’m not interested in necessarily 
asserting these against anybody. (pp. 44–45; last omission added) 
3.  Freedom Through Revenue Generation 
Even when intellectual property is not the primary motivator for indi-
viduals engaged in creative or inventive endeavors, it can play an instrumen-
tal role in securing them the freedom they seek. Meredith, a talent agent that 
Silbey interviews, describes the freedom licensing a song for a commercial 
can provide her client, a folk singer: “[b]y doing a thirty-second spot like 
that, she’ll get more money in the next year than she’d get from her record 
label in six years . . . . This was going to be money that she could make with-
out leaving her house” (p. 214; omission in original). In other cases, intellec-
tual property is critical to the existence of a company, especially in the ab-
sence of other proxies for innovative output or potential. Patents can provide 
a check on “inflated view[s] of what [the invention is] worth” (p. 212; altera-
tions in original). In the words of one of the venture capitalists Silbey inter-
viewed, patents give investors greater confidence to commit resources to 
projects that lack revenue or customers. Thus while Silbey’s sense is that “IP 
simply does not cross the minds of the[] creative or innovative clients [of IP 
lawyers]” (p. 191), “the entitlements that flow from the work as IP (e.g. reve-
nue, exclusive use) [may] arise . . . after legal intervention” (p. 192). 
In this sense, intellectual property can create breathing space, the ability 
to take risks and make long-term investments, and room to experiment away 
from the day-to-day pressure to generate revenue. This sentiment is sup-
ported by some historical studies of patent and copyright. The introduction 
of copyright in Italy ushered in a large increase in the quantity and quality of 
 
www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e011.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BEE-DMJC] (finding that, 
among respondents to a survey in the United States of inventors of “triadic patents”—patents 
whose applications were filed in both the Japan Patent Office and the European Patent Office 
and granted in the United States Patent and Trademark Office—45 percent indicated that 
purely defensive motives were highly important in their acquisition of patents). 
 20. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosys-
tem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 304–10 (2010). 
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opera production as composers were able to benefit from repeat perfor-
mances, and were incentivized to produce enduring works, Giorcelli and 
Moser found.21 Empirical historical studies that consider the introduction of 
patents, as well as the relative performance of countries that do and don’t 
have them, suggest that, if anything, patents influence the direction and dif-
fusion of innovations rather than directly influencing the number of inven-
tions.22 Moser found no increase in the number of new rose varieties intro-
duced after the creation of U.S. plant patents in 1930 even though a large 
share of patents covered roses.23 U.S. multinationals respond to stronger in-
tellectual property regimes abroad by “significantly increasing technology 
transfer to reforming countries.”24 However, increased transfer does not 
necessarily generate greater social welfare if it is associated with a higher-
than-necessary social costs. 
Still, the role of intellectual property must be understood in context. The 
serendipity that Silbey’s subjects experience is reflected in the well-
documented skew in the value of copyrighted and patented works. Most 
works have little commercial value and are not worth affirmatively protect-
ing with copyright25 or a full patent term.26 One of Silbey’s subjects, Dennis, 
“has great respect for the amount of time it takes to make a useful and novel 
discovery, and he understands how rarely it happens” (p. 232). Patent values 
are so unpredictable that patents are called “lottery tickets,”27 because their 
value depends on many factors beyond the merits of the invention or artistic 
 
 21. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity: Evidence from Italian 
Operas (May 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2505776 [http://perma.cc/7FPW-TDQP]. 
 22. Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Winter 2013, at 23; see Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System, S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
 23. Moser, supra note 22, at 28.  
 24. Lee G. Branstetter et al., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase Interna-
tional Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Panel Data, 121 Q. J. 
ECON. 321, 347 (2006) (concluding that U.S. multinationals increased technology transfer to 
reforming countries with stronger IPR regimes and documenting an increase in royalty pay-
ments and research-and-development expenditures by multinationals after intellectual proper-
ty reforms were adopted in sixteen countries); see Mercedes Delgado et al., Intellectual Property 
Protection and the Geography of Trade, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 733 (2013) (finding increased trade 
flows in intellectual-property-intensive sectors following the implementation of treaty provi-
sions about international intellectual property). 
 25. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 512–14 
(2004) (describing surveys showing that only 21 percent of library works in 1908 and less than 
a third of posters from 1976 were copyrighted). 
 26. FiveIPoffices, IP5 STATISTICS REPORT, fig.4.8 (2013), http://www.fiveipoffices.org/
statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition/ip5sr2013corr.pdf [http://perma.cc/V34T-E94U] (show-
ing that less than half of U.S. patents, and far fewer international patents, are renewed through 
their full potential term). 
 27. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2005) (explaining the lottery theory of patents). 
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work. Decades may elapse before an initial discovery is commercialized. In 
fact, 153 years passed between the first patentable version of the jet engine 
and its eventual commercialization,28 and it took more than two centuries 
for the insight that scurvy could be prevented by the vitamin C in citrus to 
fully diffuse.29 Though scurvy was the leading cause of death among sailors 
at the time of the first successful experiment in 1601, the general that fed his 
sailors three teaspoons of lemon juice a day was not a doctor.30 Vitamin C’s 
merits were confirmed 150 years later, but it would take another 120 years 
for the antidote to become widespread.31 
Despite the emphasis in patent and copyright law on novelty and origi-
nality, exactly who reaps the rewards often depends on other factors—first-
mover advantages, economies of scale, network effects,32 relationships with 
others (p. 28), randomness (p. 29), and marketing (p. 160). Serendipity may 
explain why even those who benefit from intellectual property aren’t neces-
sarily motivated by it ex ante. Jennifer was a salaried journalist who sold her 
book to a publisher and was able to live off the royalties (p. 29). Andrew was 
able to leverage his patent portfolio to get venture capital and eventually sell 
his business to a public company (p. 30). But based on probing these out-
comes in depth, Silbey concludes, “these intellectual property jackpots were 
by no means preordained,” nor did they provide the initial motivation for 
the work that led to them (p. 30). Studies of technology transactions and why 
they often fail have found that uncertainty about the value of the underlying 
work is compounded by uncertainty about the existence and value of the in-
tellectual property.33 As Kevin, a high-tech entrepreneur, put it, “[t]he big 
problem in business with patents is that the implications are totally unquan-
tifiable. What is it going to cost us—well, what are the odds we get sued? Im-
possible to figure out. What’s the likely outcome? . . . Patents? Completely 
unquantifiable.”34 
Numerous studies appear to confirm the intuition that the returns to 
creative endeavors are by and large too uncertain to make much of a differ-
ence ex ante when intellectual property is extended.35 In 1980, for example, 
 
 28. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 271–72 (1977). 
 29. Frederick Mosteller, Innovation and Evaluation, 211 SCIENCE 881, 881–82 (Feb. 27, 
1981). 
 30. Id. at 881. 
 31. Id. at 881–82, 886 n.5.  
 32. See PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE 48–53, 57–58 (2014).  
 33. E.g., Joshua S. Gans et al., The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the 
Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 MGMT. SCI. 982, 983–85 (2008). 
 34. P. 89. But see Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 
(2011) (arguing, based on an empirical analysis, that intrinsic and extrinsic factors can be used 
to predict the likelihood that a patent will be litigated). 
 35. See, e.g., Time to Fix Patents, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-
rotten-way-rewarding-them-time-fix [http://perma.cc/9MBX-CPJG]. 
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the Bayh-Dole Act made it easier for universities to patent federally-funded 
inventions.36 The cancer drug Alimta37 and the Cohen-Boyer DNA tech-
niques are among the numerous technologies that have been licensed since 
the Bayh-Dole Act.38 The Association of University Technology Managers 
credits the Act with the development of an impressive number of new vac-
cines and drugs.39 But well before the Bayh-Dole Act, universities were de-
vising and disseminating their inventions through a variety of mechanisms 
such as publication and institutional agreements.40 The pursuit of the next 
great invention, but typically without its achievement, has resulted in the 
vast majority of technology transfer offices running at a deficit.41 An inde-
pendent review of university innovation before and after Bayh-Dole con-
cluded that there was little evidence that increased licensing and university 
patenting led to meaningful growth in the economic contributions of univer-
sities.42 Reviewing a number of metastudies of changes in the patent law, 
Boldrin and Levine likewise have found, “weak or no evidence that strength-
ening patent regimes increases innovation; they find evidence that strength-
ening the patent regime increases . . . patenting.”43 
Those who have studied variations in the strength of copyright draw a 
similar conclusion regarding their impact. A study of fifty changes in U.S. 
copyright law effected by Congress and the Supreme Court between 1870 
and 2006 found that the relationship between laws that change copyright 
and the registration of new works was “essentially random.”44 Of the other 
factors the authors considered, population was the best and most reliable 
 
 36. Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The 
World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 778 (2006). 
 37. Samantha Chaifetz et al., Closing the Access Gap for Health Innovations: An Open 
Licensing Proposal for Universities, 3 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH, no. 1, 2007, http://
www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-3-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/CR7Z-FF2F]. 
 38. Sampat, supra note 36, at 783. 
 39. See Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, The Bayh-Dole Act: It’s Working, http://
www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/BayhDoleTalkingPointsFINAL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EP3D-8KDA] (“Thanks to the research conducted at U.S. universities, and to 
technology transfer, over the past 30 years, 153 new FDA approved vaccines, drugs and/or new 
indications for existing drugs were discovered through research carried out in public sector 
research institutions, consisting of 93 small molecule drugs, 36 biologics, 15 vaccines, 8 in vivo 
diagnostics and 1 over-the-counter (OTC) drug. This would not have been possible without 
the Bayh-Dole Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 40. Sampat, supra note 36, at 773–76.  
 41. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 24 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011); see also 
WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER, 9 (Joshua Bleiberg et al. eds., 2013). 
 42. Sampat, supra note 36, at 773, 781–86. 
 43. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 192 
(2008) (omission in original). 
 44. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical 
Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2009). 
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predictor of the number of works produced.45 Like Silbey’s subjects, these 
studies suggest that the impact on creators of changes in intellectual property 
is often hard to predict at best and nonexistent at worst. It’s also worth bear-
ing in mind that while the freedom that money provides to creators is im-
portant to them, it is far from guaranteed that commercial success will follow 
intellectual property acquisition. As Scott, one of Silbey’s subjects, said, 
“How are we gonna derive [economic] value from our activities? . . . Well the 
only way we’re gonna do it is if we can convince people to buy the product 
and if we can build a good product, and make it work, and that’s all people 
driven” (p. 275; alterations and omissions in original). The relevance of intel-
lectual property to reputation for recruitment is described in greater detail 
below. 
B.  Credit / Reputation 
The most important thing to professional creators, Silbey finds, is their 
reputation (p. 149). Reputational interests are complex. They reflect pecuni-
ary interests in a day and age in which Twitter account holders can monetize 
their followers46 and creators and companies have personhood interests in 
ensuring that their reputation or brand authentically reflects the image that 
they want to project.47 Reputational interests do not always map cleanly onto 
intellectual property rights: for example, in Silbey’s interviews, the “desire to 
be known as someone who contributes good ideas” is not necessarily tied to 
any particular work (p. 168). 
The ever-closer connection between creators and their audiences made 
possible by the growth of social media makes the cultivation and protection 
of a company’s brand or an artist’s reputation one of their most important 
priorities—one that can take precedence over any interest in exclusion. Crea-
tors want attention,48 and they want credit for their contributions. But more 
importantly they want accurate credit—a desire reflected outside of the 
United States primarily through “moral rights” doctrines such as the right 
“to claim authorship” of a work (the right of attribution) and the right “to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification” of a work that 
would harm the author’s reputation (the right of integrity).49 
Because trademark law protects corporations against uses that are likely 
to cause consumer confusion, corporate reputational and brand interests are 
 
 45. Id. at 1673–74. 
 46. Elijah Daniel, 5 Services to Help You Earn Money from Your Twitter Account, 
MASHABLE (Feb. 11, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/02/11/twitter-services-money/
#Ignm4ZalPiq3 [http://perma.cc/F3XT-ERP8]. 
 47. See pp. 149–50. 
 48. Michael H. Goldhaber, Attention Shoppers! The Currency of the New Economy Won’t 
Be Money, but Attention—A Radical Theory of Value, WIRED, Dec. 1, 1997, http://
www.wired.com/1997/12/es-attention/ [https://perma.cc/J8UZ-CKPZ]. 
 49. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 art. 6 bis, July 24, 1971, 102 Stat. 
2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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also strong. Silbey’s subjects describe trademarks as “priceless asset[s]” (pp. 
160–62), and survey results confirm that trademarks outrank copyright and 
patent rights.50 The perceived importance of a company’s brand can lead to 
overreach, Silbey documents, as her subjects describe their assertion of 
trademark rights in cases where they don’t have them in order to avoid un-
wanted associations.51 Susan, a university licensing officer, for example, po-
lices nonconfusing behavior that is not likely actionable under trademark 
law: 
We get involved because we’ve been given the responsibility of the use of 
the name. That is, when Sony pictures wanted to film [a bad movie 
here]. . . . [W]e didn’t want to let them, even  though . . . it was a true story, 
it did happen [here]. We didn’t want to let them, because we didn’t want to 
be associated with [that kind of] picture. (p. 161; alterations and omissions 
in original) 
1.  Credit 
In this Section, I discuss the intertwined desires of creators and the insti-
tutions that support them for credit, accurate attribution, and favorable rep-
utation by association. The desire to be recognized, separate from the desire 
to be compensated, is pervasive among creators. Corporate inventor-reward 
programs like one that Silbey describes, which symbolically rewards employ-
ees who invent with silver dollars (p. 159), have long been used to give credit 
to inventors.52 Naming credit on scientific papers, which is often shared 
among groups of authors, is another way to recognize disparate contribu-
tions within a scientific cohort and to strengthen relationships and cohesive-
ness within the group (pp. 166–67). There are complex hierarchies for as-
signing credits to some creative works. Movies, for example, have both 
opening and closing credits and name those who contribute to the movie’s 
production under a number of titles including producer, executive producer, 
co-producer, line producer, unit production manager, production supervi-
 
 50. John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Documented in 
NSF Survey, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. fig.2 (Feb. 2012), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/
nsf12307/ [http://perma.cc/BZM9-GWD9] (showing trademarks to be ranked ahead of copy-
rights, design patents, patents, and mask works in importance among companies). 
 51. See p. 161.  
 52. According to U.S. patent law, the inventions of employees that are “hired to invent” 
belong to the employer, without any requirement to compensate the inventor for their patent-
ed contributions. Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent vs. Work Made for Hire: Resolving the 
Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1227, 1240 (2012). Countries like Japan and Germany, in contrast, obligate 
employers to remunerate their employees for their inventions. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF EMPLOYEES’ INVENTION (2006), http://www.training-jpo.go.jp/en/images_x/
uploads/text_vtr/pdf/4-05.pdf [http://perma.cc/88JK-PA2W]. 
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sor, production coordinator, and associate producer.53 Where and how an 
actor or director’s name shows up in the credits are negotiated terms,54 and 
experimental studies suggest that creators are willing to give up significant 
financial benefits in exchange for receiving credit for their work.55 
Even when creators want to share their copyrighted works for free, they 
want credit. Creative Commons is an organization that facilitates the sharing 
of works through the development of licenses that authors can place onto 
their works.56 Of the nearly 1 billion pieces of content that have been li-
censed under Creative Commons, 96 percent have been licensed under 
terms that require the user of the work to give credit to the author.57 Widely 
used free and open-source software licenses give up copyright protections 
for attribution obligations.58 Studies of Wikipedia contributors, stand-up 
comics, and chefs have documented the relative importance of attribution to 
these creators.59 
Sometimes a creator’s interest in getting credit can clash with a distribu-
tor’s interest in revenue generation. Growing the reputation of an author 
may be accomplished by the widespread dissemination of her work at zero 
cost, but doing so may cannibalize the market for paid reads and may alter-
natively be favored by the distributor60 or the author.61 
Putting aside the propriety of making a copy of work, there is a sense 
that failing to give credit independently harms the creator. In a recent survey 
of 443 members of the public, 62 percent of respondents believed that 
providing proper attribution should excuse the free copying of others’ copy-
 
 53. John August, Producer Credits and What They Mean, JOHNAUGUST.COM (Oct. 21, 
2004), http://johnaugust.com/2004/producer-credits-and-what-they-mean [http://perma.cc/
Y6SA-4D8Q]. 
 54. Ben Schott, Opinion Art, Assembling the Billing Block, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/ben-schott-movies-billing-
blocks.html [http://perma.cc/6TGH-PKUQ]. 
 55. Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the 
Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1417 (2013). 
 56. See About the License, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
[https://perma.cc/E8DU-V5N4] (showing a variety of licenses, all indicating that less than all 
copyright rights are reserved to the author and designating which audiences or rights are being 
given up). 
 57. State of the Commons, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://stateof.creativecommons.org/
report/ [https://perma.cc/S9B2-AD7H] (graphic indicating that CC0, the only Creative Com-
mons license that does not require attribution, has been adopted to cover 4 percent the 882 
million pieces of CC-licensed content in 2014). 
 58. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 41, 59 (2007). 
 59. See Sprigman et al., supra note 55, at 1398–99, for a review. 
 60. See, e.g., Swift, supra note 3.  
 61. Lastowka, supra note 58, at 41 (quoting Ralph R. Shaw, Copyright and the Right to 
Credit, 113 SCIENCE 571, 572 (1951)).  
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right content.62 This finding is striking because it elevates attributional inter-
ests over copyright interests and reflects an incorrect understanding of the 
law.63 
2.  Accurate Attribution 
Preventing misattribution may be even more important to creators than 
getting credit. The lawyers Silbey talks to describe their clients’ unwillingness 
to license copyrights or trademarks because they don’t want to give up con-
trol over the work (p. 156). Sidley recounts that when Steve Jobs initially de-
cided to incur a financial loss by not licensing the characters from Toy Story 
to Disney, he did so to prevent Disney “from making bad sequels and un-
seemly merchandise” (pp. 156–57). In his own words, “[t]hat would have 
been like molesting our children” (p. 157). Brand and control are closely in-
tertwined; in the words of Barbara, a famous author, when ghostwriters are 
used on her sequels, she maintains “very close control . . . . My name is on 
the books” (p. 165; omission in original). 
The desire for accurate attribution and control goes back to the expres-
sive and personal interests that creators have in their works. As one of the 
painters Silbey interviewed explains: 
Ultimately . . . I paint because I want to share . . . my sense of how I see the 
world, how I see color, with other people. I think I’ve got to . . . not be total-
ly possessive about that . . . [A]s long as someone was [copying me] in a 
way that I felt was up to the quality [it might be OK] . . . but if you think 
they are degrading your work, that’s [another] thing. (p. 76; alterations and 
omissions in original) 
3.  Favorable Reputation by Association 
Expressive and commercial interests are also implicated when it comes 
to whom a creator is associated with. Steven Tyler of Aerosmith, the mem-
bers of R.E.M., and Neil Young have all complained about the use of their 
songs in Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential bid due to a concern, at least in 
the case of Mr. Tyler, that the use implies endorsement.64 Concern about the 
 
 62. Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy 30 (Temple 
Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2015-22, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588658 [http://perma.cc/8SDN-Q2K2]. 
 63. Id. at 3, 13. The authors also find that this reflects a deep-seated misperception of 
intellectual property’s purpose—that it is designed to prevent plagiarism or uncredited copy-
ing, when in reality it prohibits only unauthorized copying (with or without attribution). See 
id. at 16. 
 64. Ben Sisario, In Choreographed Campaigns, Candidates Stumble Over Choice of Mu-
sic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/us/politics/in-
choreographed-campaigns-candidates-stumble-over-choice-of-music.html [https://perma.cc/
Z97J-ZJUY]. 
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use of a work in ways that are offensive to the author discourages some to 
share their works as well.65 The desire to be closer, as well as further, from 
something can also be strong. As a musician interviewed for the book de-
scribed, the decision to sign with a particular label was motivated by the de-
sire to be associated with its brand: “I have tremendous respect for [the la-
bel]. They are small, but they are one of the leading . . . labels. . . . . There’s so 
much crap, you know? . . . The label thing just sets you apart . . . .” (p. 158; 
first and third omissions in original). 
Reputation matters to existing and potential employees as well. Compa-
nies can recruit the best only when employees feel affinity for the company’s 
mission. In Chapter 5, Silbey documents the tension between lawyers, who 
may be perceived as obstructionist, secretive, and exclusionary, and the sci-
entists and engineers within firms whose impulse is to share and collaborate 
(pp. 184–220). In-house lawyer Jacqueline describes “a very long and diffi-
cult process of changing the mind-set at [the company]—and I think at other 
companies, too—from hoarding the true essence of your technology to 
wanting to share it with the world, because you realized the tremendous im-
pact of what you were doing” (p. 202). In public statements, innovative 
companies like Google, Twitter, and Tesla have distanced themselves from 
the pursuit of patents because of their traditional association with exclu-
sion.66 In a blog post entitled “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,” Elon 
Musk disclaimed offensive uses of Tesla’s patents in order to make clear that 
they did not reflect a desire to exclude.67 He did so apparently to bolster the 
firm’s reputation among its employees, writing: 
Technology leadership is not defined by patents, which history has repeat-
edly shown to be small protection indeed against a determined competitor, 
but rather by the ability of a company to attract and motivate the world’s 
most talented engineers. We believe that applying the open source philoso-
phy to our patents will strengthen rather than diminish Tesla’s position in 
this regard.68 
Just as the freedom to draw from the best materials is important for individ-
ual creators, a company’s success depends on the creative people it attracts to 
its projects. 
Intellectual property policies can also enhance the reputation of a com-
pany. For example, defensive patenting can communicate a firm’s ability to 
 
 65. See Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property 
Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1975 (2014). 
 66. See Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement, TWITTER BLOG 
(Apr. 17, 2012, 17:00 UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patent-
agreement [https://perma.cc/7S8W-FHJQ]; Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, 
TESLA MOTORS BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-
belong-you [http://perma.cc/N5ZM-ADLR].  
 67. See Musk, supra note 66.  
 68. Id. 
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retaliate or signal to the market the firm’s worth. As Andrew, a software en-
trepreneur interviewed by Silbey, described: 
there is [sic] typically one or two ideas that are really valuable. . . . And then 
the company ends up getting a dozen or two dozen patents. The rest of 
them are just the blocking stuff—or not even that: they’re just something 
you build to look very attractive to a potential buyer. But they’re not re-
al . . . . (p. 208–09; first omission in original) 
Accumulating a large patent portfolio can be very lucrative: “[Company X] 
had a huge patent portfolio. And that’s where they did this trick. They had 
an in-house patent lawyer, and he really created value. . . . People looked at 
that company, the potential buyers, and said, ‘Wow! This company has one 
hundred issued US [sic] patents . . . .’ ” (p. 110; alteration and first omission 
in original). Intellectual property can help build value, as Donald describes: 
The vision I had when I was the general counsel [was] . . . we knew that we 
wanted to sell that company eventually, so I was trying to build value. So 
literally, we . . . had one thousand or two thousand registered trademarks, 
we had at least two thousand copyrights, we have fifteen or twenty patents. 
(p. 110; alteration and omissions in original) 
C.  Audiences 
One reason reputation is so important to creators is that it is related to 
their ability to get another thing they desire: audiences or customers for their 
creations. Silbey discusses the importance to creators of various relation-
ships.69 Relationships with audiences in particular provide encouragement, 
meaning, feedback, and freedom. Social scientists Ryan and Deci have iden-
tified “relatedness” as a basic human need that motivates when paired with 
“competence” and “autonomy.”70 
Audiences inspire and they encourage. In the words of one software en-
trepreneur, one of his “biggest motivation[s] is people. Because once you get 
real consumers, you can actually talk to them on the phone, and if they like 
what you do . . . that’s what really kept me going” (p. 231; omission and al-
teration in original). Audiences feed and nurture the creative process. Barba-
ra, a prolific author of children’s books, keeps letters and pictures of her ado-
lescent fans around her desk, Silbey reports, to create “a safe and 
encouraging workspace” (p. 56). Fans may also provide a sense of purpose 
and meaning, which can best be fulfilled for one artist Silbey interviewed, 
when she is performing for a live audience. As Mary describes, “when the 
room is quiet and people are just right there, there is a circuit of energy 
where you wind up with more energy at the end of the show because you feel 
like in some tiny way, you have been of service” (p. 244). 
 
 69. E.g., pp. 137–40. 
 70. Ryan & Deci, supra note 13, at 68. 
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Audiences also lead to revenue and freedom. As Richard, a global 
health-fund director at a pharmaceutical company, put it, “[w]e want to have 
an impact on health care, but we also have to make a return on investment” 
(p. 231). Having a product circulate generates the feedback and engagement 
that are needed for products to improve iteratively.71 Relationships with au-
diences can create enduring revenue streams. Though an individual work 
can be copied or pirated, a direct relationship with an audience makes it eas-
ier to promote, for example, a book or movie character who has been rede-
ployed within video games, comic books, or other media.72 Silbey discerns at 
least five distinct modes of distribution, ranging from the “many and more” 
strategy—in which creators seek to distribute as many copies of their work as 
possible, preferably through paid methods—to the “nondistribution” or, 
“hold-out” category, in which the work is distributed sparingly, if at all (pp. 
225–26). What creators want can be counterintuitive. Rather than the widest 
dissemination, some creators are seeking discerning audiences, who can 
support and fund continuing creative endeavors.73 
II. HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CAN BE SUPPLEMENTED TO GIVE 
CREATORS WHAT THEY WANT 
That three of the things creators really want are freedom, credit, and au-
diences is unlikely to surprise many. But using these concepts, rather than 
the legal constructs of intellectual property and exclusion, as starting points, 
will help ensure that creative interests are represented in discussions about 
policy in a way that is truthful, rather than oversimplistic. By and large, 
Silbey’s creators are less motivated by the ability to exclude others, or the 
possibility of a huge payout, and much more focused on the process: dedicat-
ing time to their craft and doing day-to-day work. As world-renowned visual 
artist Chuck Close has said, “[i]nspiration is for amateurs. The rest of us just 
show up and get to work.”74 In a similar vein, the influence of intellectual 
property on the day-to-day lives of creators should not be overstated. 
Thus, while it is usually assumed that creators benefit from stronger in-
tellectual property provisions, Silbey’s subjects, and the studies cited above, 
explain why the relationship between creators and intellectual property is 
more complicated. The availability of intellectual property creates security 
for a number of business models and can enable long-term investments in 
creation and innovation. It does not follow, however, that more intellectual 
property is necessarily better. On the contrary, the evidence cited above sug-
gests that the overall returns to strengthening intellectual property are un-
certain at best and negative at worst, though they can influence the direction 
and diffusion of innovations. Silbey’s subjects explain in their own words 
 
 71. See p. 233.  
 72. See p. 240. 
 73. See p. 228. 
 74. Anna Dorfman, Lessons from Chuck Close, DOOR SIXTEEN (Apr. 11, 2012), http://
www.doorsixteen.com/2012/04/11/lessons-from-chuck-close/ [http://perma.cc/A63H-UWY4].  
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why this is the case. The uncertainty and serendipity of the creative process 
limits any ex ante impact, even when the ex post rewards may turn out to be 
great. 
Intellectual property also interferes, limiting the freedom creators have 
to play and the dissemination of their creative works by others to the audi-
ences that they want.  For example, the fact that intellectual property’s de-
fault entitlements are set wrong or inefficiently75 results in a loss to follow-
on innovators or users through unnecessary forbearance or the need to “de-
sign around” the invention.76 The losses to creators, however, are also signif-
icant, and arguably more concentrated, when intellectual property’s exclu-
sionary message sends the wrong signal to followers, future customers, and 
future employees whom the creator seeks to cultivate, engage with, and hire. 
While these observations are not necessarily novel, knowing what does 
motivate creators can inform attempts to improve intellectual property law. 
These motivations can direct policymakers to the shared interests of the 
public and creators—for example, greater connection, credit, and freedom to 
create. But The Eureka Myth focuses on creation stories rather than legal re-
forms. Where Silbey leaves off, this Part picks up. 
A.  Greater Support for (Paid and Free) Inclusion, Not Just Exclusion 
Though intellectual property gives creators the right to exclude, creators 
often want to include others.77 Much of the content on several of the inter-
net’s top websites—Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter78—has been 
generated without the expectation of payment and in pursuit of passion, not 
profits.79 Sharing or including furthers creative interests by allowing a crea-
tor to connect to her audiences, earn their loyalty and admiration,80 and get 
 
 75. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND 11–12 (2008) (asserting that for most works, the owners expect to recoup value from the 
work with five or ten years of exclusive rights, and that the remainder of the term is of little use 
except as a kind of “lottery ticket”). 
 76. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 1946–50 (lamenting the various types of ineffi-
ciencies that flow from the incorrect initial allocation of rights).  
 77. The importance of supporting the right to include has been discussed by others in-
cluding THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is im-
portant not only to be able to exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to in-
clude other persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing . . . .”) and Daniel B. Kelly, The Right 
to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014). See also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use (Columbia Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 333, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132247 
[https://perma.cc/PY8A-A2BJ] (describing strategies of “tolerated use” in which a copyright is 
violated, but not enforced). 
 78. List of Most Popular Websites, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_most_popular_websites [https://perma.cc/AN2M-WQPM]. 
 79. Johnson, supra note 65, at 1959. 
 80. See p. 252–55. 
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their feedback.81 Sharing builds reputation, fame, and market share,82 as 
Silbey documents. Even when a service is initially offered for free, sharing 
creates paths to eventual revenue streams through “freemium” and related 
models, for example.83 When sharing means forbearing the exercise of exclu-
sive patent rights, it creates freedom—the freedom to operate for follow-on 
innovators. 
Technology is making sharing easier. Among copyright industries, in-
termediaries like Harper Collins and Paramount Pictures, who have tradi-
tionally added value by curating, gatekeeping, and tightly distributing select-
ed works, are yielding ground to distributors like Amazon, Netflix, iTunes, 
and YouTube (p. 224). On these new platforms, content is available in abun-
dance, anytime, anywhere. The openness of the internet makes it easier for 
scientists and engineers to learn from each other and share across firm 
boundaries. But that openness can also raise proprietary legal concerns as 
the culture clashes between lawyers, scientists, and creators. 
The suggestion here is simple: to reorient the intellectual property sys-
tem to better support the desire of creators to include and not only exclude 
others.84 Potential solutions include supporting existing platforms for shar-
ing, facilitating paid licensing, and sorting goods according to exclusive ver-
sus nonexclusive creator intent. The natural reaction to this idea might be 
that creators already have the ability to share through licensing contracts or 
through choosing not to enforce their intellectual property rights.85 But the 
ability to affirmatively share that Creative Commons offers has been em-
braced widely.86 As described below, existing experiences further demon-
strate that mechanisms for licensing or giving away exclusive rights and, 
more generally, for disavowing exclusive uses of intellectual property are less 
developed than they could be. 
 
 81. Johnson, supra note 65, at 1994–95. 
 82. See pp. 121–27. 
 83. E.g., Fred Wilson, The Freemium Business Model, AVC (Mar. 23, 2006), http://
avc.com/2006/03/the_freemium_bu/ [http://perma.cc/94UJ-GKCU]. 
 84. This suggestion is not original; in fact, it motivated the creation of Creative Com-
mons. Lawrence Lessig, CC in Review: Lawrence Lessig On Supporting the Commons, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (Oct. 6, 2005), http://creativecommons.org/lessig-letters/page/3 [http://perma.cc/
89R6-7SVF] (“The idea (again, stolen from the FSF) was to produce copyright licenses that 
artists, authors, educators, and researchers could use to announce to the world the freedoms 
that they want their creative work to carry. If the default rule of copyright is ‘all rights re-
served,’ the express meaning of a Creative Commons license is that only ‘some rights [are] re-
served.’ ” (alteration in original)). 
 85. Paul J. Heald, How Notice-and-Takedown Regimes Create Markets for Music on 
YouTube: An Empirical Study, 83 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 313, 321 (2014) (describing exam-
ples of tolerated infringement on YouTube). 
 86. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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1. Making Existing Sharing Mechanisms More Transparent and Reliable 
One problem, for example, with underenforcement, is that it does not 
reliably provide freedom to use or operate. Owners have no way to signal 
their intention to forbear from enforcement to potential users. Even if an un-
licensed use has been tolerated for a time, an owner’s lack of enforcement 
could be due to a lack of knowledge, resources, or desire. Neither the owner’s 
reason for not enforcing nor whether he or she will continue to do so is 
transparent to the public. In order to avoid stepping on landmines, risk-
averse organizations—including libraries, archives, and other memory insti-
tutions—won’t tread in the first place.87 
Even when an owner has taken affirmative steps to signal her intent to 
license or not assert intellectual property rights, the commitment in some 
cases stops short of providing follow-on innovators with the assurances they 
need to make long-term investments. Examples include the nearly one bil-
lion pieces of copyrighted works on Creative Commons,88 the millions of pa-
tents licensed through organizations like the Open Invention Network and 
the License on Transfer Network, and other standards-setting organiza-
tions89 that require royalty-limited or royalty-free licensing of patents. The 
problem with promises made to the public is that one-way promises are not 
enforceable unless they induce reasonable reliance.90 Under a federal law de-
signed to protect authors, Creative Commons licenses can be terminated af-
ter a period of time,91 as a number of commentators have lamented.92 
A number of ways to build a more reliable “semi-commons” of creative 
works have been proposed. For example, grants of copyrights to the public 
could be made irrevocable through the extension of the legal doctrine of 
abandonment to partial abandonments of rights.93 In the same spirit of “no 
takebacks,” I have suggested the creation of a “defensive-only” patent option 
that, once elected, would limit any future enforcement of the patent and stay 
 
 87. See David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (2013) (“[O]rganizations that cannot obtain permission often do 
not make their collections available at all.”). 
 88. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  
 89. Chien, supra note 22.  
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (“A promise which the promi-
sor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as 
justice requires.”). 
 91. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).  
 92. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright 
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 363–64 (2010); 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Crea-
tive Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 
318 (2007). 
 93. Loren, supra note 92, at 327–28. 
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with the patent through transfer.94 Dedication of works to the public domain 
could also be made easier, including through legitimizing defensive publica-
tion in the patent context and creating easier pathways to effect public do-
main dedication.95 Short of creating new legal doctrines and options for 
sharing, our intellectual property system could legitimize pledges to share by 
creating a registry where they could be recorded, thereby increasing the like-
lihood that a court will find it reasonable to rely on and enforce them.96 
2. Facilitating Licensing 
It is also worth considering how to make it easier for willing buyers and 
sellers of protected works to form licenses. The practical obstacles to paid or 
unpaid licensing are illustrated well in the case of orphan works, “copyright-
ed works whose owners cannot be located by a reasonably diligent search.”97 
The United Kingdom is estimated to have thirteen to fifty million orphan 
works, and a group of scholars has characterized the U.S. problem to be “at 
least as bad.”98 In the patent context, there is both unmet supply and unmet 
demand for licensing. Invalidation of a patent leads to it being cited more 
frequently by subsequent patents,99 and patent holders are willing to license 
70 percent more patents than are currently licensed.100 These failures impose 
significant costs on society. The European Union estimates that $20 billion is 
spent annually to develop already existing innovations.101 And research has 
found that large numbers of copyrighted works are not circulating, at least in 
 
 94. Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 60–63); Colleen Chien, Why It’s Time to Open 
Up Our Patent System, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2015/06/30/why-its-time-to-open-up-our-patent-system/ [http://perma.cc/
7LNX-RTEG].  
 95. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 92, at 360–64, 416–23 (arguing for adaptation of 
copyright termination provisions with respect to open-content licenses to promote public ben-
efit); Adrienne K. Goss, Note, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative 
Commons Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 990–96 (2007).  
 96. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (discussing patent pledg-
es and the benefits of a national registry for patent pledges); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompli-
ance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1084–98 (2008) (discussing the costs, benefits, and sharing norms sur-
rounding the anticommons patent model in academia). 
 97. A Case Study for Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 113th Cong. 34–35 (2013) (statement of Daniel Gervais, Professor, Vanderbilt University 
Law School); Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 3. 
 98. Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 7.  
 99. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 30. 
 100. Alfonso Gambardella et al., The Market for Patents in Europe 2 (LEM, Working Pa-
per No. 2006/04), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899539 [http://
perma.cc/J7GH-97WX] (reporting that while 18 percent of European patents are offered for 
licensing, only 11 percent are actually licensed). 
 101. Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate 
Strategy, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 419, 424 n.5 (2001). 
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part, because the entities that want to bring the work to market cannot se-
cure rights, because they cannot find the rights holder or because the holder 
is unwilling to license. 102 
Reducing information and transaction costs would likely lead to more 
licensing of patented and copyrighted works, although the challenges differ 
by subject matter and by type of work.103 In order for a license to be formed, 
a rights holder needs to be willing to license, contracting parties need to be 
able to find each other, and the parties need to agree on a price. While licens-
ing markets are robust in certain copyrighted goods, the fact that copyright 
arises automatically, without any formalities, means that a complete public 
record of copyright ownership and authorship is missing.104 A group of 
prominent copyright lawyers has soundly recommended encouraging stand-
ardized registration in public and private registries.105 
Markets for patented technology are underdeveloped for many reasons. 
The transfer of technology requires both patents and know-how to be trans-
ferred, and the availability of both for licensing is impossible to discern 
based on the public record. It can be difficult to unwind the assumption that 
patent rights are sought by owners in order to pave their own market exclu-
sivity, even though for nonpracticing entities such as universities, govern-
ments, and specialized inventors, licenses can hasten inventions to the mar-
ket in the first place.106 The doctrine of willfulness, which trebles damages 
for knowing infringements of patents, also discourages parties from talking 
to each other, lest a failed licensing negotiation become the basis for a claim 
for enhanced damages.107 The question of how to encourage technology 
transactions deserves further deliberation. For example, limiting the chill 
that the willfulness doctrine places on negotiations, enabling patent holders 
to signal a desire and willingness to license, making licensing data more 
available, or requiring patent holders to record changes to ownership are all 
policy options worth further deliberation.108 
 
 102. Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 829 (2014). 
 103. See id., at 860–61 (discussing various licensing challenges facing the book and music 
industries). 
 104. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1185–86.  
 105. Id. at 1198–203. 
 106. Ashish Arora et al., The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in Ameri-
can Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20264, 2014). 
 107. See Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 12). 
 108. See Remarks by Director Michelle K. Lee at The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) Patent Reform Forum, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 6, 2015, 12:48 
PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-michelle-k-lee-center-
strategic-and-international-studies [http://perma.cc/VK86-NEKD] (describing how patent 
reform can provide “increased transparency of patent ownership information to reduce the 
barriers to patent licensing and sales”). 
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3. Making It Easier to Differentiate Between Works Held for  
Exclusion and Inclusion 
Given the tremendous variation in the ways that intellectual property is 
used, it would also be worth exploring making it easier for creators to signal 
to the public their intents with respect to their works. As Silbey’s subjects at-
test, patents are often filed in pursuit of nonexclusionary ends such as signal-
ing value to investors or for defensive purposes.109 Twitter and Tesla found 
clarifying that their company’s patents are filed to be used “as a shield rather 
than as a weapon”110 and in support of, rather than against, an “open source 
philosophy”111 important enough that both companies publicly did it. When 
Google decided to bid for Nortel’s patent portfolio, it explained on its corpo-
rate blog that the move was intended to help, not undermine, the open-
source community and that its acquisition was defensive, a move to “create a 
disincentive for others to sue Google.”112 To ensure that such corporate rep-
resentations are backed up with reliable forbearance, companies could elect 
into a “defensive only” patent option as described above. 
Creative Commons provides one way for copyright holders to reserve 
some, rather than all, copyright rights in works. But its reach is far from 
comprehensive, and the desire for easier ways to clarify the status of works 
persists.113 As described earlier, many, if not most, copyrighted works are 
created without the expectation of remuneration, and in many cases the cre-
ators would benefit from greater circulation of the work. One example of 
how this intuition is enshrined in copyright law is the prohibition on copy-
right over U.S. government works made by federal employees,114 a policy 
originally motivated by the desire to ensure democratic engagement with po-
litical speeches and laws.115 But because the U.S. government routinely re-
leases works that are created by government contractors, which are protect-
able by copyright, there can be ambiguity about the status of the work that 
results and whether or not it can be reused.116 
 
 109. See pp. 113–14, 209–10. 
 110. Messinger, supra note 66.  
 111. Musk, supra note 66.  
 112. Kent Walker, Patents and Innovation, GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2011), https://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/patents-and-innovation.html [https://perma.cc/QT7K-
ZFG8].  
 113. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 1182–91 (critiquing Creative Commons as ill-
fitted to certain types of works, incompatible with certain kinds of uses, and failing both to lev-
erage intrinsic motivations and to capture the range of possible sharing behaviors). 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
 115. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-927, at n.28 (1990) (stating that § 105 was enacted “to 
keep government data as free as possible of potential restrictions on dissemination”). 
 116. See Joshua Tauberer et al., Open Government Data: Best-Practices Language for Mak-
ing Data “License Free”, @UNITEDSTATES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://theunitedstates.io/licensing/
#for-government-works-producted-by-a-contractor [https://perma.cc/2WSM-QVSX] (arguing 
that data becomes “more valuable when it is clear that there is a green light enabling reuse”).  
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The orphan-works problem most clearly demonstrates how legal uncer-
tainties suppress the circulation of works. Implementing orphan-works re-
forms by limiting the remedies available to reappearing rights holders, ex-
tending fair use, and supporting collective licensing regimes,117 should be 
among the highest priorities for Congress as it takes up copyright reform. 
Others have suggested statutory mechanisms for allowing users to choose to 
allow all noncommercial or humanitarian uses of their works.118 Already, the 
fair-use defense to copyright infringement is quicker to excuse infringement 
when the use is noncommercial,119 and this legal status reflects the docu-
mented instinct of members of the public that educational or humanitarian 
reuses are permissible.120 The problem in these cases may be more technical 
than legal in nature. While authors may be willing to share with certain au-
diences—for example K–12 children in neighborhoods in need121—ensuring 
that free uses are not diverted to displace paid uses is a major concern. An-
other aspect of copyright reform, therefore, should be investments in tech-
nologies that reduce the risks associated with sharing. 
Another approach to sorting between those using intellectual property 
for exclusion versus inclusion is to require that rights holders opt into exclu-
sion rather than out of it. The easiest way to do this is to make sure that the 
author or inventor actually wants the intellectual property. In fact, they usu-
ally don’t. Only one out of five U.S. companies doing research-and-
development files for any patents,122 and historical surveys show, for exam-
ple, that only 21 percent of library works in 1908, and a third of posters from 
1976, were copyrighted.123 
4. Reforming Patent Marking and Copyright Registration 
Patent law continues to require inventors to affirmatively apply for the 
grant of a patent and to make payments to keep patents in force.124 Copy-
rights under U.S. law, on the other hand, now vest automatically in the au-
 
 117. For a discussion of orphan-works reforms, see Hansen et al., supra note 87, at 23–
48.  
 118. See Goss, supra note 95, at 990–96. 
 119. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
 120. See Mandel et al., supra note 62, at 30–31. 
 121. See First Book Partners with White House, Libraries and Publishers on Groundbreak-
ing Effort to Bring Thousands of e-Books to Children in Need, FIRST BOOK (Apr. 30, 2015), http:/
/www.firstbook.org/first-book-story/media-center/press-room/428-first-book-partners-with-
white-house-libraries-and-publishers-on-groundbreaking-effort-to-bring-thousands-of-e-
books-to-children-in-need [http://perma.cc/65TW-MTRA]. 
 122. BRANDON SHACKELFORD, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. AND ENG’G STATISTICS, NSF 13-307, 
ONE IN FIVE U.S. BUSINESSES WITH R&D APPLIED FOR A U.S. PATENT IN 2008 1 (2013), 
www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13307/nsf13307.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNY-R7Q7].  
 123. Sprigman, supra note 25, at 512–14. 
 124. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2015) (proscribing the maintenance fees that patentees must 
pay to keep their patents in force). 
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thor, conferring the right to exclude regardless of whether the holder actually 
wants to do so.125 Both intellectual property regimes, however, incorporate 
the idea that those who seek to enforce their rights must take affirmative 
steps. To get statutory damages or to recover attorneys fees in copyright, an 
owner must register the work.126 And to get damages for infringement, pa-
tent holders must provide notice to the infringer, which can be accomplished 
by marking products that embody the intellectual property.127 In theory 
then, members of the public should have notice of which rights intellectual 
property holders seek to enforce. More could be done, however, to make 
these public notice mechanisms meaningful. In the case of patent damages, 
the marking requirement is riddled with loopholes.128 It does not extend to 
process patents or nonpracticed patents. If those loopholes were closed, 
marking could provide a more useful filter.129 In addition, if inducements to 
register and keep patent ownership information up-to-date were enhanced, 
more people would register ownership and transfers, which would facilitate 
licensing and signal an author’s exclusionary motive.130 The availability of 
certain remedies could be contingent upon registration to induce those with 
an exclusionary motive to register. The concept of pre-enforcement notice 
has long been embedded in U.S. law and enables the public to assess the risks 
associated with the use of intellectual property. 
B. Supporting Attribution 
Finally, one way that U.S. law could be shaped to better support creative 
interests is by recognizing the importance of attributional and reputational 
interests. Encouragingly, in congressional hearings, “the issues of individual 
authors, including attribution and the ability to say no to specific uses” have 
been discussed recently.131 Moral rights—including the rights of attribution 
 
 125. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A 
Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010). 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
 127. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012); cf. Dennis Crouch, False Marking: Lobbying Against the 
Senate Bill, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 21, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/false-marking-
lobbying-against-the-senate-bill.html [http://perma.cc/PAN7-JUBX] (describing penalties for 
the false marking of products). 
 128. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in 
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 808, 834 (2002) (calling the marking statute “incoher-
ent” and “problematic” including because it “allows knowledgeable (even willful) infringers to 
remain immune from damages liability . . . .”); Chien, supra note 22 (manuscript at 54–55); 
Christina Sharkey, Strategic Assertions: Evading the Patent Marking Requirement, 12 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 103 (2014) (calling for closing the patent-marking loophole for process 
patents). 
 129. Blair & Cotter, supra note 128, at 843–45 (suggesting reforms to the current patent-
marking requirement that would provide better notice to potential infringers).  
 130. Samuelson, supra note 104, at 1199–201.  
 131. The Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (Apr. 29, 2015) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of 
Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office).  
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and the right of integrity—are absent under U.S. law except in the case of 
works of visual art that fall within the ambit of the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(VARA).132 
Patent law at least requires that the accurate inventors of a product be 
memorialized on the face of the patent.133 Inventors can also get credit when 
their patents and publications are subsequently cited by others, generating a 
“forward citation.”134 These forms of credit-giving are limited, however. The 
relationship between patents and products in the market is tenuous at best, 
and there is no requirement that inventors be notified when an invention is 
commercialized. Forward citations are not trackable in a systematic way, and 
there is doubt about what they measure.135 Copyright law’s support for at-
tribution is even more meager. There is no comparable requirement to asso-
ciate an author with a work,136 although, removing copyright information 
including authorship information from a work is a punishable offense.137 
While copyright registrations also list a work’s authors, registration is no 
longer required under U.S. copyright law.138 
As described earlier, trademark interests are arguably most closely 
aligned with the attributional interests of creators. A series of court deci-
sions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. decision, however, significantly limited the possibil-
ity of using intellectual property law to protect attribution, as distinct from 
economic, interests.139 
In this void, there exist a few ways of enhancing attributional interests 
within copyright law. First, the Copyright Office could catalog and encour-
age best practices for giving attribution. Whether in a work itself through 
credits or in author pages or liner notes, best practices of attribution could 
be cataloged.140 Although Creative Commons provides guidance on how to 
attribute to its adopters, it appears that its attribution provisions are consist-
 
 132. E.g., Lastowka, supra note 58, at 69. 
 133. E.g., Fromer, supra note 12, at 1790–98 (2012) (contrasting these and other ways in 
which patent law is more supportive of attribution rights than copyright law). 
 134. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: 
A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 134 (2001) (“An inventor must cite all re-
lated prior U.S. patents in the patent application.”).  
 135. See, e.g., DAVID S. ABRAMS ET AL., PATENT VALUE AND CITATIONS 22 (2013), http://
www.oecd.org/site/stipatents/psdm2013_2_1_abrams.pdf [http://perma.cc/HE9Z-TAPD] (il-
lustrating the unclear correlation between forward citations and patent value above a certain 
patent value threshold).  
 136. Fromer, supra note 12, at 1793.  
 137. See 17 U.S.C. 1202 (b) (penalizing the removal of author information from a copy-
righted work). 
 138. Fromer, supra note 12, at 1793–94. 
 139. See p. 166 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003)). 
 140. See Fromer, supra note 12, at 1792. 
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ently violated. According to an analysis of over 227 million Creative Com-
mons photos, more than 90 percent were not attributed and 99 percent were 
not attributed correctly.141 Although this is just one data point, greater atten-
tion to attribution practices is needed given how important receiving credit 
is to creators. The Copyright Office could explore permitting the registration 
of attribution interests and attribution specifications separate and apart from 
copyright interests, pursuant to its authority under 17 U.S.C. § 205, for ex-
ample.142 Permitting such registrations would legitimize attribution interests 
and increase the chance that a court would find the creator’s reliance on the 
attribution actionable. Like a registry of patent pledges, a registry of Creative 
Commons –type licenses can boost the licenses’ reliability at a low cost to the 
government. 
Another approach, proposed by the Copyright Office in 2006, would be 
to reward third-party attribution in cases of orphan works.143 The proposal 
limits damages in situations where the infringer has, in good faith, carried 
out a reasonably diligent but unsuccessful search to locate the owner of the 
infringed copyright, and “throughout the course of the infringement, pro-
vided attribution to the author and copyright owner of the work, if possible 
and as appropriate under the circumstances . . . .”144 Silbey’s work validates 
the merits of such an approach. Finally, another proposal would be to re-
ward attribution by making it a “fifth” fair-use factor in determining whether 
or not the use of a copyrighted work is defensible.145 According to the pro-
posal, if an infringer gives credit to the author, the infringer’s use is more 
likely to be considered fair.146 Courts have at times taken into account attrib-
ution in applying the existing four fair-use factors, but codifying this practice 
would create a much stronger incentive for users to attribute to original au-
thors. 147 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of this writing, lawmakers are grappling with how to reform 
copyright and patent law. High on the agenda are urgent objectives like deal-
ing with abusive patent litigation,148 limiting the harm to small firms from 
 
 141. How To Attribute Creative Commons Photos, FOTER BLOG (Mar. 4, 2015), http://
foter.com/blog/how-to-attribute-creative-commons-photos/ [http://perma.cc/9RYN-Q3F9].  
 142. “Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copy-
right may be recorded in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2012).  
 143. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), http://
www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/SQN6-AG8N].  
 144. Id. at 127. 
 145. Lastowka, supra note 58, at 84–89. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 85–89. 
 148. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary 
Comm. Approves Goodlatte Patent Reform Bill by Overwhelming, Bipartisan Vote (June 11, 
2015), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2015/6/house-judiciary-committee-approves-
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poorly worded demand letters,149 and recalibrating statutory damages for 
copyright infringement.150 But while lawmakers consider these important 
policy problems, they should also consider the day-to-day lives of creators 
and how policymaking could benefit creators. Silbey’s Eureka Myth provides 
a glimpse into what is important to creators and into the role of intellectual 
property in creative pursuits. In reading it, the desire for freedom above all is 
clear. As a result, unlike some of the most controversial copyright and patent 
reforms being considered, the options described above largely do not en-
shrine rigid rules that favor one constituency over another. Instead, they cre-
ate options for those who may not be best served all the time by intellectual 
property’s default rules. For those for whom copyright and patent law are 
working fine, the world need not look different. But rewarding and making it 
easier for rights holders to signal their exclusive and inclusive intents, to 
share through paid and unpaid licenses, and for others to credit them 
through attribution would support others as their needs and desires change, 
well beyond the moment of Eureka. 
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